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Home » Exemptions » N.D.Tex.: Absent Proof Of Likelihood Of Interstate Trips, Plaintiff Truckdrivers Not Subject To Motor Carrier Act (MCA) Exemption; Summary Judgment Held In Abeyance

N.D.Tex.: Absent Proof Of Likelihood Of Interstate Trips, Plaintiff Truckdrivers Not Subject To Motor Carrier Act (MCA) Exemption; Summary Judgment Held In Abeyance

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Andrew Frisch

Songer v. Dillon Resources, Inc.

Here, the parties moved by cross Motions for Summary Judgment for a determination as to whether the Plaintiff-truckdrivers were subject to the so-called Motor Carrier Exemption of the FLSA, based on the nature of their duties driving for Defendant, an interstate motor carrier. The Court held the Motions in abeyance, questioning the quality of proof offered by the Defendant.

After acknowledging the parties agreed Defendant was a “motor carrier” the Court examined the necessary proof the Defendant was required to come forward with in order to meet its burden of proof on the exemption, and concluded Defendant had failed to do so, “[c]oncluding that plaintiffs, as truck drivers, are subject to the Motor Carrier Act exemption, however, does not end the court’s inquiry. The court is not persuaded that the exemption bears the unlimited scope and duration defendants have suggested. In support of their respective positions, the parties argue regarding the application and authority of a number of interpretive guides, including an Interpretive Bulletin of the Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, 46 Fed.Reg. 37902, 1981 WL 115508; the DOL Field Operations Handbook; and Opinion Letters of the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division. All of these sources, while not controlling or entitled to deference, are “entitled to respect” to the extent they are persuasive or offer guidance. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587-88 (2000); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). All of these sources lead to the same conclusion: a driver is subject to the jurisdiction of the Secretary, and thus under the Motor Carrier Act exemption, for a “4-month period from the date of the proof” that he was, or could have been, called upon to engage in interstate commerce. 46 Fed.Reg. 37902, 37903.

Although the court concludes that plaintiffs, as drivers for at least one motor carrier, are subject to the Motor Carrier Act exemption to some extent, defendants have failed to adduce summary judgment evidence of the specific application of the exemption as to each plaintiff for these defendants. The summary judgment evidence submitted by defendants sets forth generally the dates of plaintiffs’ employment and states generally the number of interstate trips made by that plaintiff. However, defendants have adduced nothing as would show, as to each plaintiff, proof of when he or she was, or could have been, called upon to transport goods in interstate commerce such that the exemption clock began ticking as to that plaintiff.

Defendants submitted summary judgment evidence that purports to be bills of lading or similar types of work tickets showing that various plaintiffs transported goods across state lines or within Texas in the intrastate flow of interstate commerce. Insofar as the court can tell, none of these items show any of the defendants as the employer or trucking company of record. For example, many of the work tickets, under the heading “Carrier,” list “Sunset Transp” or, in some cases, “Sunset Trucking.” Neither of these entities is a party to this action, nor have defendants pointed the court to any summary judgment evidence explaining the relationship, if any, between them and either of those entities.

The court also has concerns about defendants’ summary judgment evidence generally. Defendants’ appendices as assembled do not correspond to either the tables of contents or to internal citations to exhibits within affidavits. By way of example, in volume I of the appendix, the affidavit of Edward Brady refers to exhibits A, B, C, etc., attached thereto. The exhibits themselves, however, are tabbed as number 1, 2, 3, etc., making it difficult for the court to identify exactly to which exhibit the affidavit refers. This pattern is repeated as to each affidavit with exhibits. Further, the affidavits contain many conclusory assertions and do not properly authenticate the documents attached thereto as exhibits. As the court would find it helpful for the parties to provide additional briefing and evidence on the limited issues set forth below, it is expected that any additional evidence submitted will be properly assembled and identified and internally consistent. Therefore,

The court ORDERS that plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment, and defendants’ motion for summary judgment, be, and are hereby, held in abeyance pending further consideration by the court of the parties’ supplemental filings ordered below.”


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